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Toleration, Religion, and Accommodation 
 
Peter Jones 
 
Abstract: Issues of religious toleration might be thought dead and advocacy of 
religious toleration a pointless exercise in preaching to the converted, at least 
in most contemporary European societies.  This article challenges that view.  It 
does so principally by focusing on issues of religious accommodation as these 
arise in contemporary multi-faith societies.  Drawing on the cases of 
exemption, Article 9 of the ECHR, and law governing indirect religious 
discrimination, it argues that issues and instances of accommodation are issues 
and instances of toleration.  Special attention is given to issues that arise when 
the claims of religious belief conflict with those of other legally protected 
characteristics, especially sexual orientation.  The article uses a concept of 
toleration appropriate to a liberal democratic political order – one that replaces 
the ‘vertical’ ruler-to-subject model of toleration that suited early modern 
monarchies with a ‘horizontal’ citizen-to-citizen model appropriate to a 
political order that aims to uphold an ideal of toleration rather than itself 
extend toleration to those whose lives it regulates. 
 
Historically the idea of toleration has been most associated with religious belief and 
practice.  Even nowadays we are inclined to think of religious toleration as the 
paradigm case of toleration.  Why should that be?  The obvious answer is that 
religious disagreements have been so prominent in human history – particularly in 
modern European history – and have fuelled such bitter and bloody conflicts that 
toleration has been especially necessary to deal with them.  If there is to be peace 
without repression amongst the adherents of different religious beliefs, ‘live and let 
live’ is the only feasible option.  But there is also a less contingent reason.  To hold a 
particular religious belief is necessarily to dissent from and to reject other religious 
beliefs.  To be a Muslim is to dissent from Christianity and to be a Christian is to 
reject Islam, just as to be a Protestant is to dissent from Catholicism and to be a Sunni 
is to reject Shi’ism; while to be an atheist is to reject all of these faiths and all of their 
variants.  So different religious beliefs are not merely different; they are also 
conflicting.  To embrace a particular religious belief is necessarily to reject others and 
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that is why religious difference provides a paradigmatic site for toleration.  
Disapproval or rejection is a necessary feature of the circumstances of toleration and 
it is also a necessary feature of religious difference. 
In saying that different religious beliefs conflict, I do not mean to say that their 
adherents must come to blows, even though they frequently have.  I mean only that 
those adherents are putting forward rival sets of belief and, to that extent, they must 
disagree with one another.  If they hold, nevertheless, that they should refrain from 
coercing or persecuting or disadvantaging those whom they reckon propagate and 
pursue mistaken beliefs, they are committed to toleration; and, if all parties to the 
dispute take that view, they will engage in mutual toleration.  They may very well 
find reasons within their own faiths for desisting from intolerance but, even if they do, 
those will still be reasons for toleration. 
Some people are uncomfortable with these obvious truths and insist that we 
should celebrate rather merely tolerate our differences.  In the case of religious 
differences, however, it is very hard to make sense of that injunction.  If I am a 
Muslim, how can I celebrate the fact that others refuse to recognise Mohammed as 
God’s prophet, fail to accept that the Koran is the word of God, and pursue unIslamic 
forms of life?  If I am a Christian, how can I celebrate others’ failure to recognise that 
Jesus Christ was the Son of God, that faith in him is the path to salvation, and that the 
worship of other gods or no god is deeply mistaken?  To assimilate differences in 
religious belief to the kind of differences we can celebrate – differences in, for 
example, dress or music or literature or diet – is not to take them seriously.   
 
1. Religious Toleration: Unnecessary and Moribund? 
 
All that said, we might still question how much religious toleration matters nowadays.  
In the European world, people seem now to care less about religion than they did in 
the past and, the less they care, the less religious toleration matters.  Moreover, even if 
we cannot yet do without religious toleration altogether, that sort of toleration might 
be thought dead as an issue.  The battle for religious toleration was fought and won 
long ago and preaching the virtues of religious toleration is now a pointless exercise 
in preaching to the converted.  In this article I challenge those dismissals of religious 
toleration.  I shall say a little about why we still need religious toleration, but I shall 
devote most of the article to challenging the claim that religious toleration is now a 
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dead issue.  I shall do so primarily by arguing that issues of accommodation, which 
have become highly contentious in many European societies, are issues of toleration.  
Those issues have risen to prominence partly, though not wholly, as a consequence of 
the transformation of societies like Britain, France, Germany, Italy and the 
Netherlands, from largely mono-faith (if multi-denominational) societies to multi-
faith societies.  But first a few words on why we still have, and still need, religious 
toleration. 
 Because religious toleration is such a widely accepted ideal in liberal 
democratic societies, it is easy to overlook its existence.  Indeed, perversely, its 
widespread acceptance is sometimes mistaken for its non-existence.  Commentators 
sometimes suppose that toleration is toleration only if it hurts.  If it comes easy, there 
is not much that is tolerant about it.  There may be some merit in that view if we 
conceive toleration as a psychological phenomenon.  The more people undergo inner 
torment and have to struggle to make themselves endure the conduct of others, to 
which they deeply object, the more toleration they actually display; and, if we think 
toleration is virtuous, the more virtuous they will be.  By contrast, the non-chalant and 
the laid-back, to whom toleration comes easy, may be thought to display little of it 
and perhaps for that reason to be less worthy of congratulation. 
However, logically, there is nothing to commend the view that toleration has 
to be painful to be real.  Suppose I object to x, but I am so persuaded of the merits of 
toleration in cases like x, that I tolerate x painlessly and without hesitation.  It would 
be perverse to hold that, because I am so convinced of the case for toleration, I do not 
really tolerate x.  A tolerant society does not cease to be a tolerant, just because its 
population is wholly sold on the merits of toleration.  Of course, we must distinguish 
toleration from mere indifference and, insofar as the current age lives more 
comfortably with religious diversity than previous ages, that condition may owe more 
to indifference than to toleration (Williams 1996).  That claim is not wholly mistaken, 
but it is very far from being wholly true.  There are large swathes of people in 
European societies who are strongly committed to religious beliefs of various sorts; 
there are also large numbers of people who are deeply hostile either to religious belief 
in general or to particular faiths.  Insofar as those people do not follow their historical 
predecessors and resort to political power to promote their own beliefs and to 
suppress the objectionable beliefs of others, why is that?  The answer is not that they 
hold their beliefs any less fervently; it is that they are more persuaded of the rightness 
 4 
of mutual toleration.  So, even if the battle for religious toleration has been fought and 
won, it is a simple error to suppose that religious toleration is no longer a feature, and 
no longer need be a feature, of contemporary European societies. 
 But has the battle for religious toleration been fought and won?  If we cast our 
eyes beyond Europe, it clearly has not.  Think, for example, of conflicts between 
Sunnis and Shi’as in different parts of the Muslim world, or of the attacks suffered by 
the Ahmadi sect in Pakistan, or of conflicts between Christians and Muslims in 
Nigeria, Sudan and, more recently, Egypt.  Post-War Europe has also seen bitter and 
bloody conflicts between religiously divided populations in areas such as Northern 
Ireland and Bosnia.  These may seem exceptional cases and, even though they have 
been associated with differences in religious identity, we may doubt how far the 
conflict has really been about religion.  But we can still turn to cases like the Rushdie 
Affair, or the Danish cartoons, or the issues raised by niqabs and burkas, or conflicts 
over the merits of Sharia courts and legal pluralism, to show that issues concerning 
religious toleration are far from moribund.  However, what is at stake in that last set 
of issues is not so much whether there should be religious toleration but what sort of 
religious toleration there should be.  That is also true of the issues surrounding 
accommodation. 
 By religious accommodation I understand an arrangement that is designed to 
ease the lot of the accommodated and, without which, they would find themselves 
disadvantaged compared with others.  As Martha Nussbaum (2008: 21) says, 
accommodation aims to give religious people a ‘break’ by, for example, exempting 
them from general rules that would otherwise compel them to betray their beliefs or to 
bear a burden not borne by others.  However, I do not mean ‘accommodation’ to 
encompass just any adjustment a society makes in response to changes in the religious 
make-up of its population.  If, for example, the religious make-up of chaplaincies in 
hospitals or prisons is adjusted to match changes in the religious make-up of a 
population, there is no reason to describe that as ‘accommodation’.  I limit the idea of 
accommodation to cases in which an adjustment is made to provide for the particular 
demands of a particular faith, such as a particular dress code or dietary requirement.  
Accommodation, as I shall use the term, is therefore difference-sensitive rather than 
difference-blind. 
 This idea of accommodation is particularly associated with multiculturalism; 
indeed it is often now treated as definitive of multiculturalism.  I shall explain later 
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why I choose to examine it with respect to religion in particular rather than culture in 
general.  I shall draw my examples from Britain, simply because that is the case I 
know best, but the issues they exemplify are common to other European societies 
(Doe 2011), and to many non-European societies, that have multi-faith populations.  
First, however, I need to explain the kind of toleration of which accommodation is a 
part. 
 
2. Toleration and Liberal Democracy 
 
How are we to understand a tolerant political regime under modern liberal democratic 
circumstances?  In simple analyses of toleration, we frequently use a model of person-
to-person toleration.  Person A objects to the conduct of person B, is able to prevent 
B’s conduct if he so chooses, but allows B to continue with that conduct. In that case, 
A tolerates B’s conduct.  If we turn to the types of regime that were prevalent in post-
Reformation Europe, we can model their toleration or intolerance on the simple 
person-to-person case.  An early modern monarch who was a Catholic, but who had 
Protestants amongst his subjects, could tolerate those subjects by, for example, 
allowing them to engage in Protestant forms of worship.  Alternatively, he could opt 
not to tolerate them by suppressing their forms of worship.  We can tell the same story 
about a Protestant monarch and his Catholic subjects.  In both cases, it is clear who 
was doing the tolerating (or not) and who and what was being tolerated (or not). 
Now fast forward to our own age.  Where do we find religious toleration in 
contemporary liberal democratic regimes?  We might try to find the answer by 
searching for an equivalent to the early modern monarch.  But there are two problems 
with that strategy.  First, liberal democratic regimes, at least ideally conceived, do not 
commit themselves to a particular religious faith or to a particular variant of a 
religious faith.  On the contrary, we would think it quite improper for a liberal 
democracy to privilege, patronise or promote any religious faith.  But if a regime 
remains neutral on matters of religious faith, it will neither approve nor disapprove of 
any and so will be incapable of the toleration or intolerance that was open to an early 
modern monarch. 
Secondly, it is not all clear who or what we should conceive as the equivalent 
of the early modern monarch.  Assuming that the democracy we are contemplating is 
an indirect democracy, the most obvious candidate might seem to be its elected 
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government.  But a democratic government (again in idea) stands in a quite different 
relation to its population than did an early modern monarch.  An elected government 
is supposed to be the servant rather than the master of its population and it has no 
business either tolerating or not tolerating the population that it serves.  Perhaps, then, 
it is the democratic majority that equates with the monarch and the minority with his 
subjects so that the ‘monarchical’ majority tolerates (or not) a ‘subject’ minority.  
However, that simple model of superordinate and subordinate fits ill with the equality 
that we associate with liberal democracy, especially with the equal status of citizens.  
It also misrepresents the reality of many modern democratic societies in which there 
is no simple majority that tolerates an identifiable minority. 
 It would seem, then, that if we are to make sense of toleration as a 
characteristic of a liberal democratic regime, we should turn away from the model 
provided by post-Reformation monarchies.  It could be, of course, that toleration is a 
quality we cannot ascribe to contemporary democratic regimes.  As a political ideal it 
may belong to a pre-democratic age; liberal democratic arrangements, rather than 
instantiating toleration, may have superseded it (Heyd 2008; Newey 1999).  Yet, 
tossing the idea of toleration aside in that manner also seems odd, since we typically 
conceive liberal democracy as in part driven by, and as realising, an ideal of 
toleration.  
 The solution to these puzzles lies, I suggest, in conceiving a liberal democratic 
order as one that is committed to an ideal of toleration and that seeks to uphold that 
ideal.   It is an order that secures freedom of religion for its citizens by not allowing 
them to use political power either to privilege their own faith or to suppress the faiths 
of others.  The Christian is precluded from not tolerating the Muslim, and the Muslim 
is precluded from not tolerating the Christian; similarly the Sikh is not free to be 
intolerant of the Christian or the Muslim, and neither of them is free to be intolerant 
of the Sikh.  Thus, subject to a qualification I shall make in due course, the religious 
toleration secured by a liberal democratic regime is not one in which the regime itself 
does the tolerating.  Rather, the toleration it secures is the toleration it requires of its 
citizens in relation to one another; it is ‘horizontal’ toleration amongst citizens, rather 
than ‘vertical’ toleration of subjects by government.  It is toleration amongst people of 
equal status rather than the toleration of subordinates by a superordinate.
1 
 The most obvious way in which a liberal democratic society can secure that 
tolerant order is by establishing rights to religious freedom for all of its members and 
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by imposing upon them corresponding duties to respect the rights of others.  It might 
do that by entrenching religious freedom in its constitution, through a bill of rights for 
example, so that citizens enjoy rights in the form of constitutional immunities.  Or it 
might secure those rights through ordinary legislation.  Or its commitment to mutual 
toleration may be deeply ingrained in its political culture, so that its citizens enjoy 
secure rights of religious freedom de facto even if not de jure. 
 One feature of this way of understanding political toleration is that it is an 
arrangement that requires people to be tolerant of one another, most obviously by 
subjecting them to a legal obligation that prohibits intolerance.  But is ‘required’ 
behaviour of that sort consistent with the idea of toleration?  If A is legally prohibited 
from violating B’s religious freedom, does not that simply pre-empt A’s toleration?  
A’s being able to prevent B’s conduct, if he so chooses, is normally regarded as a 
necessary condition of A’s being capable of tolerating B; if A is deprived of that 
ability, he is in no position either to tolerate or not tolerate B.  Thus, if a society 
establishes a legal arrangement that secures A’s and B’s religious freedom by 
prohibiting their being intolerant of one another, that arrangement might seem to 
displace, rather than to realise, toleration.  
 However, that chain of thinking relies on the person-to-person model of 
toleration, whereas my concern is with toleration as a feature of a political and legal 
system.  If a society is committed to an ideal of toleration and seeks to organise itself 
in a way that realises that ideal, how can it to do so except by upholding and limiting 
its citizens’ freedom in relation to one another? It will not establish an order that 
leaves citizens free to tolerate one another, or not, as they so choose.  Rather it will 
secure its citizens’ freedom so that they are unprevented from doing those things that 
they ought to be unprevented from doing; it will secure toleration by holding possible 
or potential intolerance at bay.  Thus a tolerant political order will be distinguished 
not by its allowing citizens to tolerate or not tolerate one another as they choose, but 
by the complex of freedoms and unfreedoms it secures for its citizens (Jones 2012). 
 We should note, however, that it is not the case that such an order must 
deprive individual citizens of the possibility of acting on their own commitment to 
toleration.  On the contrary, A in his treatment of B can still be motivated by his own 
beliefs about how he should treat B.  The existence of a law requiring him not to 
infringe B’s freedom does not mean that his conduct must be motivated (only) by that 
legal obligation, just as the existence of a law prohibiting murder or assault does not 
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render us incapable of refraining from murder or assault for any reason other than our 
being subject to that legal obligation. 
 The political liberalism of John Rawls (1993) provides a clear example of this 
sort of tolerant political order.  It aims to provide a conception of justice for a society 
whose members possess different and conflicting comprehensive doctrines, including 
different and conflicting religious doctrines.  Of the two principles of justice that 
Rawls constructs for this diverse society, it is the first that most obviously relates to 
religious toleration since it includes the right to religious freedom.  But in fact both 
principles are relevant in that both embody the notion that a just liberal society would 
not use political power of any sort either to promote or to disadvantage any reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine or its associated conception of the good.  The ‘neutrality’ of 
Rawls’s just society is a consequence of its thoroughgoing commitment to toleration 
(Jones 2003).  The feature of Rawls’s just and tolerant society to which I want to draw 
attention is that it is not a society that leaves its citizens free to tolerate one another in 
the political domain as they so choose.  On the contrary, the society’s basic structure 
is one whose laws and institutional design secure toleration by depriving citizens of 
the freedom to be intolerant of one another.  Certainly good Rawlsian citizens will 
embrace the principles of justice and will therefore endorse the justice of their 
society’s arrangements, including the justice of mutual toleration, but the society’s 
commitment to toleration lies chiefly in the character and make-up of its basic 
structure rather than in the attitudes of its citizens.   
 
3. Toleration and Accommodation 
 
How then does this relate to the issue of accommodation?  Rawls’s conception of a 
just society is often described as ‘difference blind’.  It is blind to difference because it 
establishes the rules and arrangements of a just society without reference to the 
specific demands of any particular comprehensive doctrine or conception of the good.  
By contrast, the idea of accommodation is associated with ‘difference sensitivity’ – 
with the need to take account of, and to adjust a society’s arrangements to, the 
different demands of different religions and cultures.  The move from difference-
blindness to difference sensitivity is frequently associated with the rejection of 
neutrality.  In fact, there is no reason why it should be, since the complaint that 
difference blindness fails to be genuinely neutral can be accompanied by the claim 
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that genuine neutrality, genuine even-handedness, requires difference sensitivity, 
though that is not an issue that I shall pursue here. 
 While I do not intend to tie my argument on the relation between toleration 
and accommodation to Rawls’s theory of justice, it is an argument that is broadly 
consistent with his theory.  The kind of accommodation that is relevant to the 
polyethnic and multi-faith character of Britain and other European societies, and that 
has been pursued in those societies, tends to be of two sorts.  It consists either in 
refinements to what Rawls calls the ‘basic structure’ of those societies, or in 
adjustments to public policies pursued within that basic structure. 
 
4. Toleration and the ECHR, Article 9 
 
So consider the decisions made by the courts when they deal with cases 
relating to Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).  The first 
clause of Article 9 gives everyone ‘the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion’, including the freedom ‘either alone or in community with others and in 
public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance’ (my emphasis).  Its second clause, however, subjects the freedom to 
manifest one's religion or belief ‘to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of 
public order, health or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. 
Cases concerning Article 9 that come before the courts are typically cases in which a 
person claims that his right to manifest his religion in particular circumstances has 
been interfered with, while others either resist that claim of interference or argue that 
it is justified by the limitations listed in the Article’s second clause.   
The ECHR was drafted and ratified long before the issue of multi-faith or 
multicultural accommodation arose to prominence.  Even so the issues that courts face 
in relation to Article 9 are frequently issues of accommodation.  They raise the 
question of whether someone has the right to manifest his particular religion in 
particular circumstances and, in resolving that question, courts take account of the 
specific demands of a person’s faith as well as of the specific features of the 
circumstances in which he wishes to manifest his faith.  They are cases, that is, in 
which the issue is whether and how far a person’s wish to manifest his religion should 
be accommodated by others.  Thus, in Britain, such cases have concerned the right of 
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a Christian employee to be exempt from his employer’s practice of requiring Sunday 
working;
2
 the right of a Muslim teacher to attend Friday prayers, even though his 
doing so entailed his being absent from school during teaching hours;
3
 the right of a 
Muslim schoolgirl to attend school wearing a jilbab, rather than the shalwar kameez 
provided by the school’s uniform;4 the right of a Christian schoolgirl to wear a 
‘purity’ ring contrary to her school’s no jewellery policy;5 and the right of a Hindu on 
his death to be cremated by open pyre rather than by the enclosed form of cremation 
currently provided in Britain.
6   
These cases exemplify what I mean by ‘refining’ the basic structure.  They 
take the right of freedom of religion (which, as a general right, is not in dispute) and 
consider how far that right should entitle the bearer of a specific religious belief to 
have that belief accommodated by others, in public or private capacities, so that he 
can manifest his religion (which, as a specific right, is in dispute). These are issues of 
religious toleration in that they concern the scope of freedom that a society should 
secure for its religious adherents, within which they can manifest their beliefs.  
Indeed, the toleration required in cases of accommodation is typically more 
demanding than in the ‘standard case’.  In the standard case, toleration requires no 
more of people than that they abstain from persecuting others for their religious 
beliefs or from preventing others’ pursuit of their beliefs.  In the case of 
accommodation, toleration typically requires people to make a sacrifice or bear a cost 
or endure an inconvenience for the sake of beliefs they do no share, and that can be 
significantly more demanding than the standard case.  That is why this form of 
toleration remains controversial even in societies that claim to be wholly committed to 
religious toleration.  
Another area of law that can be seen as refining the basic structure as it relates 
to religious freedom is the law on religious discrimination.  In Britain, discrimination 
law often secures a greater measure of accommodation for the religious than human 
rights law.  It has, for example, required a greater measure of accommodation from 
employers, in respect of their employee’s beliefs, than has human rights law (Vickers 
2008: 86-94; Ahdar and Leigh 2005: 165-8). But, before turning to that case, I want to 
consider a different sort of religious accommodation – accommodation through 
exemption. 
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5. Toleration and Exemption 
 
Accommodation through exemption has attracted a great deal of attention, perhaps 
because exemptions are more conspicuous forms of accommodation than those 
provided by human rights law or discrimination law.  In Britain, three cases of 
exemption are particularly well know: the exemption of turban-wearing Sikhs from 
the requirement to wear a crash helmet if they ride a motorcycle; the exemption of 
Sikhs from law that prohibits the carrying of knives in public, so that they can carry 
the kirpan as their faith requires; and the exemption of Jews and Muslims from animal 
welfare legislation requiring the stunning of animals before slaughter, without which 
Jews and Muslims would be unable to slaughter animals according to the rites of their 
religion. 
These exemptions do not comport wholly with the model of political toleration 
that I sketched earlier, in that they are not cases in which the state acts as a third party 
that lays down rules requiring its citizens to be tolerant of one another.  Rather in 
these cases the state secures toleration by itself granting the exemption.  In relation to 
Rawls’s theory, these are most appropriately seen as cases that arise within the basic 
structure.  That is why they typically have an ad hoc character.  In each case, a 
particular public policy has been adopted that comes up against a particular demand 
of a faith and, in each case, adherents of that faith receive an exemption so that they 
will not be ‘burdened’ by the policy in ways that others are not. 
 What justifies our conceiving these exemptions as exercises in toleration?  The 
reasons that justify the policies from which religious groups are exempt are reasons 
that apply to the exempted groups no less than to other members of the population.  
Public efforts to prevent head-injuries, reduce knife crime, and avoid unnecessary 
animal suffering are as relevant to and for Sikhs, Jews and Muslims as they are for 
other citizens of the UK.  That need not always be true of a public policy that makes 
an exception.  Suppose, for example, that a government commits itself to a campaign 
of mass vaccination but that it can readily identify members of the population who 
possess a natural immunity to the disease it is combating.   In that case, the 
government has reason to except those with a natural immunity from its campaign 
since that exception will in no way conflict with the campaign’s purpose: vaccinating 
people who are already immune would be entirely pointless.  In that sort of case, there 
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are no conflicting considerations and nothing that requires toleration.  But that is not 
true of the religious exemptions I have cited.  Motor-cycling Sikhs, for example, are 
exempted from wearing crash helmets not because turbans provide the same degree of 
protection from injury as crash helmets but in spite of the fact that they do not.  
Similarly, Muslims and Jews are exempted from animal welfare legislation not 
because concerns for animal welfare do not arise when animals are ritually 
slaughtered, but in spite the fact that they do.  The reasons driving the public policy 
apply to all but, in the case of Sikhs, Jews and Muslims, reasons grounded in respect 
for their beliefs are allowed to override the reasons for the public policy.  That is why 
they constitute ‘exemptions’ rather than mere ‘exceptions’.  These exemptions might 
also seem to have the classic structure of a tolerated condition.  The authors of the 
public policy have reason to object to anyone’s not complying with the policy but, out 
of deference to the beliefs of Sikhs, Jews and Muslims, they refrain from making 
those groups comply with the policy.
7
   
There is, however, reason to question whether exemptions exhibit that 
‘classic’ tolerant structure.  It is clear enough who and what are being tolerated, but 
who is doing the tolerating?  I previously spoke of the ‘authors’ of the policy from 
which the religious groups are exempt, but those who first devise the policy are not 
the only or the most significant party.  No less relevant is the government that adopts 
the policy and the legislature that approves it and turns it into law.  But the laws that 
instantiate the policy and that exempt religious groups from it will remain on the 
statute books and govern people’s conduct long after those who were involved in their 
drafting and enactment have disappeared from the scene.  Once again, the problem of 
identifying a tolerator arises from use of the person-to-person model of toleration.  
Rather than viewing exemptions according to that model, we would do better to see 
them as representing a society’s public stance on what should and should not be 
tolerated.  Toleration is a feature of the exemptions themselves rather than an 
expression of any particular person’s or party’s toleration.  Because the religious 
groups involved are minorities, it is tempting to say that the exemptions constitute 
toleration of minorities by the majority.  But that is likely to misstate the facts (e.g. 
how many members of the majority are even aware of the exemptions, and how and 
when have they bestowed that toleration?) and there is no reason why Sikhs, Jews and 
Muslims should not endorse the society’s general policy alongside their own 
exemption.  For example, turban-wearing Sikhs can be expected to endorse their own 
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exemption from crash helmet legislation, but they can also endorse the law that 
requires non-Sikhs to wear crash helmets: they can recognise that, since non-Sikhs do 
not possess the reason that Sikhs possess for not wearing crash helmets, the balance of 
considerations applying to non-Sikhs justifies the compulsory wearing of helmets.  
Similarly, Jews and Muslims can accept that, in the absence of reasons provided by 
their own faiths, the public policy that requires animals to be stunned before slaughter 
is entirely justified.  Insofar as a population adopts that ‘public’ perspective, the 
toleration it secures through exemption fits ill with the imagery of ‘vertical’ 
toleration, even though the locus of this form of accommodation is the state rather 
than civil society. 
 
6. Toleration and Indirect Religious Discrimination 
 
In Britain the most comprehensive provision for religious accommodation is now 
legislation governing indirect religious discrimination.  British law prohibits both 
direct and indirect religious discrimination in employment and in the provision of 
goods and services.
8
  If we take the case of employment, an employer discriminates 
directly against an employee if he treats that employee less favourably than he treats, 
or would treat, others because of the employee’s religion or belief; if, for example, he 
refuses to employ or to promote a Muslim because he is a Muslim. An employer 
discriminates indirectly against an employee if he has a provision, criterion or practice 
(PCP) that he applies to an actual or potential employee, which disadvantages the 
employee by comparison with other employees because of the employee’s religion or 
belief.  However, an employer is not guilty of indirect discrimination if he can show 
that the application of his PCP is a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate 
aim’.  If, for example, a security company required its officers not to leave their place 
of work during each working day of the working week, that PCP would, prima facie, 
discriminate indirectly against a Muslim employee who wished to be absent from his 
place of work during lunchtimes on Fridays so that he could attend a local mosque for 
Friday prayers. If, however, the security company had a contractual obligation to its 
client to provide day-long security and would suffer financial penalty if it did not 
honour that obligation, a tribunal or court might deem the company’s PCP requiring 
the employee to remain on-site a ‘proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim’, 
in which case the company would be not guilty of indirect discrimination.
9
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We might be reluctant to treat the prohibition of direct religious discrimination 
as a requirement of toleration, perhaps because direct religious discrimination seems 
so obviously wrong, as does direct discrimination on grounds of race, gender or 
sexual orientation.  But we should remember that the standard case of religious 
toleration requires people only to refrain from persecuting others because of their 
religion or from actively impeding the practice of their religion.  Prohibiting direct 
religious discrimination does not seem very far removed from that standard case.  
However, I shall not press that point since my concern is with toleration and 
accommodation, and merely refraining from direct discrimination does not entail 
‘accommodation’, as I use that term. 
Proscribing indirect religious discrimination, by contrast, does entail requiring 
a form of accommodation.  That accommodation differs from the accommodation 
secured by exemptions in that in discrimination law it is not the state, or the public 
qua public, that does the accommodating.  Rather the state requires members of civil 
society – employers and providers of goods and services – to do the accommodating.  
The relevant accommodation is therefore more straightforwardly ‘horizontal’ than in 
the case of exemptions, although civil society includes the government in its role as 
employer and provider of goods and services.  To simplify matters here, I shall focus 
on the case of employment.  The law on indirect religious discrimination requires an 
employer to accommodate the demands of an employee’s religious faith insofar as her 
doing so is consistent with her using proportionate means to pursue a legitimate aim.  
This may involve her in a degree of genuine inconvenience and require her to 
subordinate her own preferred way of running her organisation to the demands of an 
employee’s faith.  To that extent, it imposes an obligation of toleration upon the 
employer.   
The kind of accommodation that this obligation can entail is well illustrated by 
the case of Noah v. Desrosiers.
10
  Sarah Desrosiers ran a small hairdressing salon in 
London.  She described the kind of hairstyling the salon offered as ‘funky, spunky and 
urban’.  Bushra Noah was a Muslim and Desrosiers was aware of that when she 
invited her to attend an interview for a position in the salon.  However, during the 
course of the interview, Desrosiers discovered that Noah would refuse to remove her 
headscarf, which covered her hair entirely, while she worked in the salon.  Desrosiers 
required her staff to make their own hair visible to customers so that customers could 
see the sort of styling the salon offered (a practice that is apparently common in hair 
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dressing salons in Britain).  For that reason, she did not offer the position to Noah.  
Noah then registered a complaint of direct and indirect discrimination against the 
Desrosiers.  An Employment Tribunal found Desrosiers not guilty of direct 
discrimination but guilty of indirect discrimination.  In particular, the Tribunal held 
that Desrosiers’s applying to Noah her PCP requiring staff to make their own hair 
visible to customers did not constitute ‘a proportionate means of achieving a 
legitimate aim’.  Thus, in this case, Desrosiers was required to tolerate the demands of 
Noah’s religious faith as Noah herself interpreted them, and the demands of a faith 
that Desrosiers did not share, to the extent of having to sacrifice her own (not 
unreasonable) preference about how she should run her salon. 
In the eyes of the Employment Tribunal, Desrosier’s application of her PCP to 
Noah failed to pass the test set by the proportionality criterion.  The natural way of 
understanding ‘proportionate’ here is with reference to the employer’s aim: given the 
employer’s aim and supposing it to be legitimate, what sort of means is proportionate 
to that aim?  In other words, it will be the end that justifies, or fails to justify, the 
means.  Understood in that way, the proportionality criterion sets a simple threshold 
test: up to that threshold the employer is obliged to accommodate the demands of his 
employee’s faith, but, once the threshold is reached, she is freed from that obligation, 
even if her failure to accommodate affects the religious employee more adversely than 
the employer herself.  However, tribunals and courts in Britain have often interpreted 
the proportionality test more expansively: to be proportionate the means must take 
account of the extent of the PCP’s impact upon religious employees, or potential 
employees, as well of its relation to the employer’s aim.11  That interpretation sets a 
test that potentially enlarges the domain in which an employer is required to 
accommodate. 
British law allows employers to take account of a ‘protected characteristic’, 
including religion or belief, if it is a genuine occupational requirement.  Both 
‘organised religions’ (e.g. churches and mosques) and organisations with an ‘ethos 
based on religion’ (e.g. religious charities and faith schools) are entitled to 
discriminate, directly as well as indirectly, on grounds of religion in employment, 
provided the religious requirement they apply is an occupational requirement and a 
proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim (Equality Act 2010, schedule 9, 
paras 2 & 3).  So, for example, there is no problem in a church’s discriminating on 
religious grounds in its appointment of a priest or in a mosque’s doing so in its 
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appointment of an imam, although there may well be a problem if either takes account 
of an applicant’s faith when it appoints a gardener or a cleaner or an accountant.  
  In addition, ‘organised religions’ (but not organisations merely with an ‘ethos 
based on religion’) have a limited right to discriminate on grounds of gender, sexual 
orientation and marital status.
12
  That right clearly ranks as an ‘exemption’.  How 
should we understand it in relation to toleration?  If we take the Catholic Church as 
our example, from its perspective taking account of gender, sexual orientation and 
marital status in making ecclesiastical appointments may be no different from taking 
account of a candidate’s faith.  It is simply a matter of complying with the doctrines 
and traditions of the Church; gender, for example, is a relevant job qualification for a 
Catholic priest, just as plumbing skills are for a prospective plumber and medical 
qualifications are for a prospective doctor.   
But how should these exemptions be understood from the perspective of 
public policy?  They might be understood in precisely the same way as they are by the 
Catholic Church.  Discrimination on grounds of gender, sexual orientation or marital 
status, which would ordinarily be wrong, is rendered right – or at least not wrong – 
when it is engaged in for religious reasons.  In that case, exempting the Catholic 
Church would be like exempting the naturally immune from a public vaccination 
campaign; there would be nothing for public policy to tolerate.  However, the 
character of recent British public policy on these forms of discrimination indicates 
otherwise. The exemption enjoyed by the Catholic Church (and other organised 
religions) is more analogous to exemptions that allow biking Sikhs not to wear crash-
helmets and Jews and Muslims not to stun animals before slaughter.   Public policy in 
Britain now embodies a clear commitment to the wrongness of discrimination on 
grounds of gender, sexual orientation or marital status.  It also embodies a more 
general commitment to the equal status of men and women and of heterosexuals and 
homosexuals.  It is committed to giving gays and lesbians equal public recognition, 
where ‘recognition’ means accepting their identity as normal, legitimate and 
unexceptionable.  It is similarly committed to rejecting and opposing treatment of 
homosexuals that implies that their homosexuality marks them out as perverse, 
inferior or unfortunate. But, where religious beliefs sanction discrimination on 
grounds of gender or sexual orientation, public policy allows its own commitment to 
non-discrimination and equal recognition to be overridden by deference to the beliefs 
of organised religions.  In other words, for public policy the exemptions it grants to 
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organised religions in relation to gender and sexual orientation are exercises in 
toleration.
13
 
That is also indicated by the way in which public policy has tightly limited the 
religiously inspired discrimination that it is willing to tolerate.  Organised religions 
are not at liberty to discriminate on grounds of sex and sexual orientation in 
employment merely as they see fit.  Discrimination is permitted only if it is needed ‘to 
comply with the doctrines of the religion’ or to avoid conflict with ‘the strongly held 
religious convictions of a significant number of the religion’s followers’ (Equality Act 
2010, schedule 9, para. 2).  The exemptions are ‘intended to cover a very narrow 
range of employment: ministers of religion and a small number of lay posts, including 
those that exist to promote and represent religion’ (Equality Act 2010: Explanatory 
Notes, para. 799).  The discriminatory requirement must also be ‘crucial to the post 
and not merely one of several important factors’ (ibid., para. 800).14 
The limited extent to which public policy is willing to tolerate religiously 
inspired discrimination is also indicated by the way in which judicial decisions have 
prioritised the claims of sexual orientation over those of individual religious believers.  
Amongst several cases in which the claims of individual religious belief and sexual 
orientation have clashed, those of Lillian Ladele and Gary McFarlane are particularly 
instructive. 
Lillian Ladele had worked for the London Borough of Islington since 1992 
and became a registrar of births, deaths and marriages in 2002.  The Civil Partnerships 
Act came into force in 2005, enabling gays and lesbians to enter into legally 
recognised partnerships. Ladele asked not to be required to officiate at civil 
partnership ceremonies, since she believed that actively participating in enabling same 
sex unions was contrary to her Christian faith. The Registrar’s Office at which she 
worked stated candidly that it would have no problem in fully employing Ladele in 
other duties; moreover, other registrar’s offices were known to have accommodated 
requests like Ladele’s.  Even so, Ladele lost her job because she was unwilling to 
officiate at civil partnership ceremonies.  She took her case to an Employment 
Tribunal, claiming direct and indirect discrimination and harassment.  The Tribunal 
found in her favour on all counts.
15
 The case then went to an Employment Appeal 
Tribunal, which overturned the previous ruling and held that the Council was entitled 
to require all of its registrars to participate in the full range of its services.
16
  The 
Court of Appeal upheld that decision.
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Gary McFarlane worked for the relationship counselling service, Relate.  Like 
Ladele, he was a committed Christian and, because of his Christian beliefs, he was 
unwilling to provide sex therapy for gay and lesbian couples.  Relate found his 
unwillingness contrary to its Equal Opportunities and Professional Ethics policies and 
dismissed him from his post.  McFarlane claimed he had suffered direct and indirect 
discrimination and unfair dismissal, but the tribunals that heard his case rejected his 
claim and the Court of Appeal dismissed his application for permission to appeal 
against their decision.
18
 
I cite these cases to illustrate the issues of toleration they present.  Of course, a 
court or tribunal is not itself engaged in decisions about the rights and wrongs of 
toleration and accommodation.  Its task is only to determine what the law requires in 
cases that come before it, although what the law requires in this area is often far from 
straightforward.  But the existence of these sorts of case obliges legislators, and 
ultimately the citizens on whose behalf they act, to confront issues that are essentially 
about how much, and what sort of, toleration people should be able to demand of one 
another. 
The Ladele and McFarlane cases are interestingly complicated in relation to 
toleration.  Was the issue here not one of toleration simpliciter, but rather one of 
whose intolerance should prevail?  We might think that the employers’ negative 
response to Ladele’s and McFarlane’s requests was no more than intolerance of 
intolerance.  Glen Newey (1999) has argued that demands that are ostensibly demands 
for toleration are typically demands by competing parties for intolerance of the other.  
Is that true of these cases?  
Ladele’s and McFarlane’s disapproval of same-sex relationships might attract 
the description ‘intolerant’, but disapproval is a normal feature of toleration.  
Toleration consists in not preventing what we disapprove of or dislike.  In orthodox 
usage, if we take no exception to the conduct that we refrain from preventing, our 
non-prevention does not constitute toleration.  But Ladele and McFarlane did not 
merely disapprove; they acted on the principles and beliefs that underlay their 
disapproval.  Should that earn them the description ‘intolerant’?  We would not 
normally describe someone as intolerant merely in virtue of their refraining from 
doing what they believe to be wrong. For example, we would not normally describe as 
‘intolerant’ a vegetarian’s refraining from eating meat, or a Muslim’s insisting on 
attending Friday prayers, or a Catholic doctor’s refusal to perform an abortion, or a 
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conscientious objector’s refusal to fight in a war, even though others may wish those 
individuals to behave differently.  If we are intolerant merely in virtue of not behaving 
as others wish us to, toleration turns into nonsense.  The Christian would be intolerant 
because he does not comply with the Muslim’s wish they he should convert to Islam, 
and the Muslim would be intolerant because he does not comply with the Christian’s 
wish that he should convert to Christianity (see further, Jones 2007). 
There is, however, a further consideration.  Had Ladele’s and McFarlane’s 
request for exemptions been granted, that might have adversely affected the 
opportunities of others.  In fact, in the case of Ladele sufficient registrars were 
available to take her place in officiating at civil partnership ceremonies and she could 
have been fully employed on other tasks of her post.  McFarlane too claimed that it 
was entirely practicable for Relate to exempt him from counselling same-sex 
couples.
19
 However, had enough registrars and enough counsellors requested and 
received the exemptions that Ladele and McFarlane sought, the opportunities of same-
sex couples to enter into civil partnerships and to receive sex therapy might have been 
seriously diminished.  It would be odd if we accounted people’s conduct tolerant or 
intolerant according to the contingencies of circumstance, so that they were 
‘intolerant’ if circumstances were such that, in remaining faithful to their convictions, 
people just happened to diminish the options available to others, and they were ‘not 
intolerant’ if circumstances conspired to preclude any adverse effect for others.  It is 
intentions rather than consequences that mark people out as tolerant or intolerant.  
Someone who intends to impede another’s conduct behaves intolerantly even if he 
fails in his aim; and someone who unintentionally impedes another’s conduct is not 
intolerant in spite of the impediment he actually causes.   
 Another consideration is that Ladele and McFarlane occupied professional 
roles.  Normally we would think that the demands of toleration are satisfied by 
restraint rather than positive assistance – it is enough that we refrain from preventing 
what we object to; we need not positively promote it.  But if employees occupy a role 
in which they are tasked with providing a service for others and if they withhold that 
service, their act of withholding can reasonably count as intolerance. 
 However, Ladele and McFarlane might have met these points by protesting 
that they sought exemption only insofar as that was consistent with their 
organisation’s continuing to provide a full service to all of its clients, including same-
sex couples.  If their exemption would really have impeded the delivery of services, 
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they would have recognised the unreasonableness of that state of affairs and have 
been willing to resign from their posts.  If that was their position, so that they did not 
seek to prevent the activities from which they wished to be exempt, their requests for 
exemption would not qualify as intolerant.  A gay and a lesbian work colleague did 
claim to have been ‘victimised’ and ‘discriminated against’ by Ladele and those two 
individuals played a leading role in securing her dismissal; but their complaint seems 
to have been only that Ladele’s unwillingness to officiate at civil partnerships 
constituted an ‘act of homophobia’.20  
If Ladele and McFarlane were not themselves being intolerant, what could 
justify the law’s intolerance of their belief-based wishes?  It is here that the claims of 
toleration come up against those of recognition.  In Ladele the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal and the Court of Appeal treated as irrelevant the fact that Ladele’s wish 
could be accommodated without impairing the service the Council provided for civil 
partnerships.  Ladele was requesting an exemption for a discriminatory reason and her 
request was contrary to Islington’s Dignity for All policy; that sufficed to make the 
Council’s treatment of Ladele proportionate.21  Similarly McFarlane lost his case 
because his request to be exempt from giving sex therapy to same-sex couples 
amounted to discrimination against gays and lesbians, which was in direct conflict 
with Relate’s equal opportunities policy.  In Ladele, there was also argument, 
endorsed by the Court of Appeal, that the Council was legally obliged not to 
accommodate Ladele’s wish.22  The sum of all this is that the exemptions requested 
by Ladele and McFarlane were found intolerable not – or not only – because they 
were liable to reduce the opportunities actually open to gays and lesbians.  They were 
intolerable because they were an affront to gays and lesbians; they were at odds with 
the equal status and the equal respect to which gays were entitled.  It is in that sense 
that public policy prioritised the claims of the gay community to recognition over 
those of religious adherents to toleration. 
But, if that is the legal position with respect to religious individuals, why is it 
not also the position with respect to organised religions?  Why should public policy 
tolerate the wishes of some, but not of others, to discriminate against gays for 
religious reasons?  The answer would appear to lie in a balancing of competing 
considerations – a balance of a sort that we frequently confront when we have to set 
the boundary that divides the tolerable from the intolerable.  There are many forms of 
employment in which those who have religious objections to homosexual conduct 
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need encounter no conflict between their religious convictions and their legal 
obligation not to discriminate on grounds of sexual orientation.  Many such 
employment options were open to Ladele and McFarlane, so that not permitting them 
to discriminate in their roles as, respectively, registrar and counsellor did not compel 
them to compromise their religious convictions.  Similarly, religious organisations 
that do not have clear doctrinal obligations to discriminate on grounds of gender or 
sexual orientation are not compelled to betray their beliefs by being prevented from 
practising those forms of discrimination.   By contrast, if the doctrine of an organised 
religion requires it not to have female or sexually active homosexual priests or imams, 
a law requiring it not to discriminate on grounds of sex and sexual orientation in 
appointing priests and imams would prevent it from complying with its own doctrine.  
That would be a serious infringement of its religious freedom and would almost 
certainly contravene Article 9 of the ECHR.  So, although there is an element of 
compromise in the way British public policy has dealt with the conflicting claims of 
religious belief and sexual orientation, there is a rationale for the particular 
compromise that it has adopted.  That is not to say that the compromise upon which it 
has settled is uncontroversially ‘right’.  For example, discrimination law does not 
condone gender or racial disadvantage in employment on the ground that the 
employees who are the victims of that disadvantage have many other jobs open to 
them in which they would suffer no such disadvantage.  Ladele and McFarlane might 
therefore ask why, when they suffer disadvantage because of their religious beliefs, it 
should fall to them to avoid that disadvantage by finding another job.   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
I conclude, then, that issues of religious accommodation present us with issues of 
toleration and issues that we cannot plausibly pronounce ‘dead’.  People’s reluctance 
to conceive issues as issues of toleration often stems from their belief that toleration 
must entail an unequal relationship between tolerator and tolerated and that toleration 
itself must be a form of condescension, a matter of grace and favour (e.g. Addis 1996; 
Brown 2006; Phillips 1999). I cannot refute that belief here, so I simply observe that 
both of its elements are false.
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  Toleration can be mutual and equal, and it can be 
grounded in deontological reasons such as respect for persons.  Indeed, as Rawls 
argues, it can be a matter of right and a requirement of justice.   
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Would it be more appropriate in contemporary circumstances to characterise 
the issues I have examined here as issues of ‘cultural’ rather than religious difference?  
Most of the cases I have considered could be characterised as issues of cultural 
accommodation,
24
 but polyethnic societies do not typically treat all aspects of culture 
as having the same claim to accommodation.  In the cases I have considered, the 
conduct that has been eligible for accommodation is rule-governed conduct rather 
than merely habitual conduct; it is conduct that people understand themselves to be 
obligated to engage in or to refrain from.  The degree to which the accommodation of 
a group’s culture in European societies turns out to be accommodation of its religion 
is striking and is, I believe, no accident, since it is people’s believing themselves to be 
normatively not at liberty to behave or not to behave in certain ways that is so often 
crucial to the case for accommodation (Jones, forthcoming).
 
 I see no good reason 
therefore to pretend that the differences that have been my concern are other than 
religious differences, particularly since the religious do not see themselves in other 
terms. 
 At the same time, my argument about the relationship between toleration and 
accommodation does not apply only to religious belief.  It applies equally to cases in 
which the different and conflicting beliefs are moral but non-religious in character.
25
   
It is worth recalling in this connection that Article 9 of the ECHR accords people 
freedom of thought and conscience as well as religion, and that British discrimination 
law applies to ‘belief’ as well as to religion, although what sort of non-religious belief 
counts as ‘belief’ for purposes of discrimination law the courts have still largely to 
settle.
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 Just as I have not substituted the language of culture for that of religious 
belief, so I have not couched my argument in the language of ‘identity’.  ‘Identity’ is 
too undiscriminating a notion.  It cannot begin to explain why polyethnic or multi-
faith societies do, or why they should, accommodate some practices and not others.  
And there is another way in which the notion of (mere) identity seems inadequate for 
the issue of religious accommodation.  On many occasions religion does serve merely 
as a marker of identity in the same way as does race or ethnicity or sexuality or 
occupation or class.  Indeed, bloody conflicts in religiously divided societies often 
seem to owe more to differences in identity than to differences of belief.  Moreover, 
where religion is a mere marker of identity, where it is only ‘skin-deep’, toleration can 
seem as inappropriate as it is in cases of racial difference.  But, in cases of religious 
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accommodation, belief matters.  In all three of the forms of accommodation I have 
considered – exemptions, Article 9 of the ECHR, and the law on indirect religious 
discrimination – people’s believing that certain forms of conduct are required of them 
is crucial to the existence, and to the case for, the accommodation.  If the relevant 
population did not hold different and conflicting beliefs, the need for accommodation 
would not arise, and it is because these accommodations cater for different and 
conflicting beliefs that they present us with bona fide issues of toleration.
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1. I set out and defend this view of liberal democratic toleration at greater length in 
Jones 2007. 
 
2. Copsey v. WWB Devon Clays Ltd, [2004] UKEAT/0438/03/SM; [2005] EWCA Civ 
932. The Court of Appeal’s judgement in this case is particularly interesting in 
relation to accommodation.  While all three judges found against Copsey (the 
employee), they expressed different views on the degree of accommodation Article 9 
requires of employers. 
 
3. Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority, Employment Appeal Tribunal: [1976] 
ICR 461; Court of Appeal: [1978] 1 QB 36; [1977] 3 WLR 396.  I examine this case 
in Jones 1994.  
 
4. Begum v Denbigh High School, [2004] EWHC 1389 (Admin); [2005] EWCA Civ 
199; [2006] UKHL 15.  A subsequent and similar case concerned the right of a twelve 
 24 
year-old Muslim schoolgirl to wear a niqab contrary to her school’s uniform policy: X 
(by her father and litigation friend) v. The Headteachers and Governors of Y School, 
[2007] EWHC 298 (Admin). 
 
5. R (Playfoot) (A Minor) v. Governing Body of Millais School, [2007] EWHC 1698 
(Admin) 
 
6. Davender Kumar Ghai v. Newcastle City Council [2009] EWHC 978 (Admin); 
[2010] EWCA Civ 59. 
 
7. The case of Sikhs’ exemption from the law prohibiting the carrying of knives in 
public is not so clear.  The toleration required in this case might be thought all the 
greater, since the potential consequences for others (being stabbed and possibly 
killed) are so much more severe.  On the other hand, the aim of the law is to prevent 
knifings and therefore to prevent those people carrying knives who intend to use 
them, or who are liable to use them, to harm others.  People who carry knives for 
innocent reasons are not the law’s target; the legislation that exempts people who 
carry knives for religious reasons also exempts those who do so for reasons related to 
their work, and those for whom knives are part of their national dress (e.g. Scotsmen 
wearing Highland dress, which includes a dirk inserted into a sock).  So the general 
spirit of the law is that people should not carry knives in public unless they have good 
reason to do so. Read in that way, the ‘exemption’ enjoyed by Sikhs is more like an 
exemption enjoyed by the naturally immune from compulsory vaccination and makes 
no call upon toleration. 
 
8. In Britain, legislation governing religious discrimination in relation to employment 
was introduced in the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, in 
response to an EU Directive establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation (Council Directive 2000/78/EC).  Legislation prohibiting 
religious discrimination in the provision of goods and services was included in the 
Equality Act 2006.  Both sorts of regulation were incorporated in the Equality Act 
2010, which harmonised the law governing discrimination in relation to a number of 
‘protected characteristics’ including disability, race, gender, and sexual orientation, as 
well as religion or belief. 
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9. This example is based on Cherfi v. G4S Security Services Ltd [2011] 
UKEAT/0379/10/DM, in which the Muslim employee’s claim of indirect 
discrimination was dismissed.  Two other important features of that case were that a 
prayer room was available to the employee at his place of work, and the company 
offered him the option (which he declined) of working on Saturdays or Sundays 
instead of Fridays. 
 
10. My account of this case is based on details given in Noah v. Desrosiers [2008], 
(unreported) judgement of the Employment Tribunal, case number 2201867/2007. 
 
11. E.g. ibid., para.160: ‘the function of the legislation, in its application to indirect 
discrimination, is to outlaw particular means of pursuing what may be found, in 
principle, to be entirely legitimate aims, because of their disproportionately 
discriminatory impact.’ (My emphasis)  In addition, Lucy Vickers (2010: 289, 295-6) 
has suggested that the number of individuals affected by a requirement might be taken 
into account in assessing proportionality, as might the issue of whether a belief is, or 
is not, core to the believer’s faith, although courts have not been consistent on that 
issue.  
 
12. In addition, ‘organisations relating to religion or belief’ are permitted to restrict 
their memberships and those to whom they provide goods and services on grounds of 
sexual orientation as well as religion, provided such restrictions are necessary to 
comply with the organisation’s doctrines or to avoid conflict with the strongly held 
convictions of a significant number of the religion’s or belief’s followers (Equality 
Act 2010, schedule 23, para. 2). 
 
13. Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (2002) has argued that recognition can be itself a form of 
toleration.  However, if by ‘toleration’ we mean enduring what we view negatively 
(the sense in which I use the term in this article), recent British public policy in 
relation to homosexuality has been committed to combating the negativity that 
toleration presupposes, so that the recognition it directs towards the gay population 
has been quite different from toleration. Indeed, one might say that public policy has 
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14. For analysis and comment on the law now relating to who may and who may not 
discriminate on grounds of religion, including in respect of gender and sexual 
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opposed to ‘divine legislation’) that Emanuela Ceva examines in Ceva 2010. 
  
26. One case in which this issue has arisen is Grainger PLC and others v. Nicholson, 
[2009] UKEAT/0219/07/ZT.  In that case, the judge ruled that a belief in man-made 
climate change, and the moral imperatives arising from that belief, did qualify as a 
‘philosophical belief’ for purposes of the 2003 Religion or Belief Employment 
Regulations. 
 
27. This article draws on a paper presented to a conference held in July 2010 at the 
University of Copenhagen on ‘Toleration, Respect and Space – Concepts, 
Conceptions and Applications’, which formed part of the RESPECT Research 
programme, and on another paper presented in May 2011 to a conference on 
Toleration organised by the Political Theory Group of the Irish Political Studies 
Association.  I am grateful to the participants in both events for their comments on 
those papers.  Special thanks to Ian Carter, Emanuela Ceva, Elisabetta Galeotti, Iseult 
Honohan, Sune Laegaard, Andrew Shorten, and this journal’s referees. 
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